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Ethical analyses, professional guidelines and legal decisions support the
equivalence thesis for life-sustaining treatment: if it is ethical to withhold
treatment, it would be ethical to withdraw the same treatment.
In this paper we explore reasons why the majority of medical profession-
als disagree with the conclusions of ethical analysis. Resource allocation is
considered by clinicians to be a legitimate reason to withhold but not to
withdraw intensive care treatment. We analyse five arguments in favour of
non-equivalence, and find only relatively weak reasons to restrict rationing
to withholding treatment. On the contrary, resource allocation provides a
strong argument in favour of equivalence: non-equivalence causes prevent-
able death in critically ill patients. We outline two proposals for increasing
equivalence in practice: (1) reduction of the mortality threshold for treatment
withdrawal, (2) time-limited trials of intensive care. These strategies would
help to move practice towards more rational treatment limitation decisions.
INTRODUCTION
An intensive care consultant is summoned to the
emergency department with his registrar to assess a seriously
ill patient. Mr W is a fifty-year old man who presented with
breathlessness, and has clinical and radiological features of
right-sided pneumonia. He is moderately hypoxic despite
high-flow oxygen. There is limited information available, but
the patient is believed to have an underlying neurological
problem. Mr W is too breathless and drowsy to communi-
cate his wishes.
The intensive care consultant asks his registrar to stay
with the patient while he calls Mr W’s family. It takes some
minutes to contact them, but when he speaks to the patient’s
wife it becomes apparent that Mr W has a rapidly progres-
sive neurodegenerative condition, with recent severe func-
tional decline. His wife does not believe that he would want
to receive intensive care for a chest infection. A quick phone
call to Mr W’s GP confirms that this information is correct.
The ICU consultant decides on this basis not to admit Mr W
to intensive care.
But when the consultant returns to the resuscitation area
he discovers that his registrar had misunderstood his instruc-
tions. He has already intubatedMrW and transferred him to
intensive care. Mr W is stable on the ventilator with good
oxygen levels. At this point the ICU consultant is reluctant to
withdraw treatment, and elects to institute a ‘one-way wean’.
As Mr W improves, the level of respiratory support will be
reduced until he can be taken off the ventilator. However,
levels of support will not be increased, and additional
support (including inotropes and cardiopulmonary resusci-
tation) will not be provided. Mr W is discharged to the ward
two days later.1
The case of Mr W is not an unusual one for those who
work in intensive care units (ICU). Medical and nursing
staff in ICU face questions every day about whether or
not potentially life-saving treatment should be provided
or continued. Approximately 25% of patients admitted to
1 This case is fictional, though based on real cases that we have
encountered.
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medical intensive care units die.2 The majority of deaths
in intensive care follow explicit decisions to withhold or
withdraw treatment.3
Yet the decisions made by medical staff in MrW’s case
appear to conflict with a principle that is widely promul-
gated in medical ethics, the so-called Equivalence Thesis
(ET), i.e. that withholding and withdrawing life saving
treatment are ethically and legally equivalent. The inten-
sive care consultant did not wish to withdraw treatment
from W although he would have had no qualms about
withholding it. Is this justifiable?
In this paper, we will look at the reasons why medical
practice may not be in concordance with the Equivalence
Thesis. We will outline briefly the ethical and legal basis
for ET, and the empirical evidence of medical profes-
sionals’ views. We will explore potential explanations for
a medical perception that withholding and withdrawing
decisions are ethically different. In particular, we will
look at the potential for resource allocation to provide an
explanation for the difference between withholding and
withdrawing intensive care treatment. We analyse five
arguments for resource allocation playing a role only,
or to a much greater degree, in withholding decisions.
These arguments provide only a limited justification
for the non-equivalence of treatment withholding and
withdrawal, and this distinction comes at a significant
cost. We finally provide two potential strategies for
addressing this problem and for moving practice towards
equivalence.
EQUIVALENCE
The Equivalence Thesis has been expressed as a statement
about the comparative moral permissibility of two types
of action.4
Equivalence Thesis (ET): Other things being equal, it is
permissible to withdraw a medical treatment that a
patient is receiving if it would have been permissible to
withhold the same treatment (not already provided),
and vice versa.
We might contrast this with Non-Equivalence.
Non-equivalence (NE): Even where other things are
equal, it is sometimes permissible to withhold treat-
ment from a patient though it would not be permissible
to withdraw the same treatment if already started.5
The equivalence or otherwise of withholding and
withdrawing treatment is related to other debates
about the potential equivalence of action and omission,
or of killing and letting die.6 We will return briefly
to the acts/omissions distinction later, but we will
largely set those questions aside, and focus on decisions
about withholding/withdrawing treatment in intensive
care.
ET has received considerable support from philoso-
phers, and on inspection appears hard to doubt. Why
should the intensive care consultant feel reluctant to
withdraw treatment from Mr W? If it is not in his best
interests to provide treatment, the doctor appears just
as justified in a decision to withhold treatment as in
one to withdraw treatment. Conversely, if it were actu-
ally in Mr W’s interests to receive treatment, then it
would be just as wrong to withdraw treatment as to
withhold it. Importantly, there are no necessary differ-
ences in the intentions of the doctor who withholds
treatment compared to the one who withdraws it, no
differences in consequences for the patient, no differ-
ences in the ultimate cause of their death, nor any dif-
ference in the moral responsibility of the doctor for his
or her decision.
What is more, Non-equivalence appears to lead to
absurd consequences. In the case of Mr W, the delay
caused by a phone call leads to W receiving intensive care
for his pneumonia and surviving (at least in the short
term). However, if it is ethical not to treat Mr W’s
pneumonia with mechanical ventilation and respiratory
support, why should it make a difference whether the
ICU consultant arrives back in time to stop him from
2 M.A. Metcalfe et al. Mortality among Appropriately Referred
Patients Refused Admission to Intensive-care Units. Lancet 1997; 350:
7–11; S. Ridley & S. Morris. Cost Effectiveness of Adult Intensive Care
in the UK. Anaesthesia 2007; 62: 547–554; H. Wunsch et al. End-of-life
Decisions: a Cohort Study of the Withdrawal of all Active Treatment in
Intensive Care Units in the United Kingdom. Intensive Care Med 2005;
31: 823–831.
3 J.L. Brieva et al. Withholding and Withdrawal of Life-sustaining
Therapies in Intensive Care: an Australian Experience.Crit Care Resusc
2009; 11: 266–268; P.E. Spronk et al. The Practice of and Documenta-
tion on Withholding and Withdrawing Life Support: a Retrospective
Study in two Dutch Intensive Care Units. Anesth Analg 2009; 109:
841–846; C.L. Sprung et al. End-of-life Practices in European Intensive
Care Units: the Ethicus Study. JAMA 2003; 290: 790–797; Wunsch
et al., op. cit. note 2.
4 D.P. Sulmasy & J. Sugarman. Are Withholding and Withdrawing
Therapy Always Morally Equivalent? J Med Ethics 1994; 20: 218–222;
discussion 223–224. Some might distinguish between strong forms of
ET (‘Other things being equal, it is always permissible to withdraw etc.)
and weaker forms (‘Other things being equal, it is usually permissible
etc.). In this paper we refer to and defend the former, strong form of ET.
The other way of expressing the ET is that the ‘bare difference’ between
withdrawal and withholding makes no moral difference to the question
of whether or not treatment should be provided.
5 This statement of Non-equivalence is based on the idea that it is less
morally troublesome to withhold treatment than it is to withdraw treat-
ment. An alternative Non-equivalence thesis might endorse the opposite
view (that treatment withdrawal is preferable to treatment withhold-
ing). See below.
6 Sulmasy & Sugarman, op. cit. note 4; J. Rachels. 2001. Killing and
Letting Die. In Encyclopedia of ethics. L.C. Becker & C.B. Becker, eds.
2nd edn. New York & London: Routledge: 947–950.
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being intubated? Similarly, Non-equivalence seems to
imply that in some circumstances it would be permissible
to fail to reinstitute respiratory support if there were a
power cut, or a patient became accidentally disconnected
from respiratory support, though it would be imper-
missible to deliberately withdraw mechanical ventilation
from the same patient. But why should the chance event
of a power cut or an accidental disconnection determine
whether or not a patient dies from lack of respiratory
support?
Finally, non-equivalence has significant negative impli-
cations. If there is a higher (harder to achieve) threshold
for withdrawing treatment than withholding it, there is a
danger that doctors will decide not to provide treatment
out of fear that, once started, they will not be able to
discontinue it. As a consequence patients who could
have benefited may be denied potentially life-prolonging
treatment.
Some have argued for an alternative form of non-
equivalence, i.e. that it is preferable to withdraw treat-
ment than to withhold the same treatment because of
reduced uncertainty.7 Providing a patient with a trial of
therapy, and making a decision to stop treatment after 24
or 48 hours, may allow a far better assessment of the
patient’s prognosis and chance of surviving intensive
care than an assessment made before treatment is started.
This argument provides one reason for making a prac-
tical distinction between withholding and withdrawing
treatment; it is actually compatible with ET, however,
since it points to a relevant factual difference between
withholding and withdrawal. If the prognostic facts were
identical, there would be no reason to prefer withdrawal
over withholding.
ET has also been supported by a large number of pro-
fessional guidelines.8 A recent systematic survey of guide-
lines and decision-support tools available on the internet,
or published in the medical literature, found that 28 of 29
documents that referred to withholding/withdrawal of
treatment stated that the two were ethically or legally
equivalent.9 In the United Kingdom ET has received
support in case law, probably most clearly in the case of
Tony Bland, a patient in a persistent vegetative state
whose doctors sought the permission of the courts to
withdraw artificial feeding. Lord Lowry stated that ‘I
do not believe that there is a valid distinction between
the omission to treat a patient and the abandonment of
treatment which has been commenced . . .’.10
NON-EQUIVALENCE
ET is not universally supported, however. In a paper in
1994, Daniel Sulmasy and Jeremy Sugarman argued that
there is an intrinsic moral difference between withdraw-
ing and withholding.11 The patient who has been started
on treatment has a prima facie claim to that treatment on
the basis of prior acquisition. The patient may waive this
claim (for example if the patient or their surrogates judge
treatment to be of no benefit), in which case withholding
and withdrawal of treatment become equivalent. But if
they do not waive their claim, it is worse to take treatment
away from the patient than to fail to provide it.12 The
distinctiveness of this argument is that non-equivalence
is only apparent in cases where treatment should be
provided.
Nevertheless, Sulmasy and Sugarman’s argument has
been challenged.13 In particular, their claim that a patient
who has had treatment started has a prima facie claim to
that treatment appears simply to restate their belief that
withdrawing is different from withholding.14
Although they do not suggest it, perhaps a more plau-
sible way of defending Sulmasy and Sugarman’s claim
would be on the basis of a duty of care. Doctors take on
a duty of care to patients once they start to treat them.
This duty may be greater than their wider duties to
patients in general. For example, a doctor usually has a
greater duty of care to patients who have attended her
practice or clinic than to patients whom she has never
met. On this basis, if it were actually in Mr W’s interests
to receive treatment it would be worse for the intensive
care doctor to withdraw treatment than to withhold it
in the emergency department. Yet in many circums-
tances doctors have actively taken on a duty of care to
patients even if they have not yet started treatment.15
7 J.L. Vincent. Withdrawing may be Preferable to Withholding.
Critical care (London, England) 2005; 9: 226–229. We will return to
this practical distinction in our proposals at the end of this paper.
8 General Medical Council. 2006. Withholding and Withdrawing Life-
prolonging Treatments: Good Practice in Decision-making. London:
GMC (BMA edn. 2007). Withholding and withdrawing life-prolonging
medical treatment : guidance for decision making. 3rd edn. Malden,
MA & Oxford: Blackwell; L. Snyder & C. Leffler. Ethics Manual: Fifth
Edition. Ann Intern Med 2005; 142: 560–582.
9 M. Giacomini et al. Decision Tools for Life Support: a Review and
Policy Analysis. Crit Care Med 2006; 34: 864–870.
10 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789.
11 Sulmasy & Sugarman, op. cit. note 4.
12 Ibid.
13 J. Harris. Are Withholding and Withdrawing Therapy Always
Morally Equivalent? A Reply to Sulmasy and Sugarman. J Med Ethics
1994; 20: 223–224; R. Gillon. Withholding and Withdrawing Life-
prolonging Treatment – Moral Implications of a Thought Experiment.
J Med Ethics 1994; 20: 203–204, 222.
14 Harris, op. cit. note 13.
15 Imagine, for example, that the intensive care consultant admitsMrW
to the intensive care unit (but has not yet intubated him and put him on
the ventilator). He leaves the ward in order to contact the family and
GP. He decides after speaking to them that he will not institute invasive
respiratory support. However, in his absence the registrar has already
put Mr W on the ventilator.
A Costly Separation between Withdrawing and Withholding Treatment in Intensive Care 3
© 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Furthermore, certain types of doctors have strong duties
of care to patients that they have neither met nor started
to treat. Imagine that an emergency physician is in the
middle of interviewing a moderately but not acutely
unwell patient about their past medical history. A nurse
interrupts to tell the doctor that a patient has just
arrived by ambulance who has had a cardiac arrest. It
would not be acceptable for the emergency physician to
continue his interview on the basis that he has an estab-
lished duty of care for this patient that is greater than
for the patient just arrived. Likewise, intensive care cli-
nicians do not have obligations solely or preferentially to
patients in one geographic area of the hospital. Rather,
they have an obligation to any critically ill patients that
they have the means to support, including patients in the
wards, in the emergency department, or even outside
the hospital.
One other source of disagreement with ET has come
from orthodox Judaism. Halakhic law is often inter-
preted to prohibit physical intervention in a dying patient
that might hasten their death.16 This has led to the devel-
opment of mechanical ventilators with timers that must
be regularly reset.17 Such timers potentially allow doctors
caring for orthodox Jewish patients to decide not to
restart mechanical ventilation (after the timer turns it
off), though it would have been impermissible to with-
draw the same treatment. But while religious beliefs
might lead patients to have a preference for withholding
over withdrawing, and to choose to have timers on their
ventilators, it is hard to see why this makes a moral
difference. The design or purchase of timing devices for
ventilators and the decision to put a patient on a ventila-
tor with a timer are in themselves acts that lead to the
hastening of death (where the patient would not other-
wise have treatment withdrawn). Imagine, for example,
that an ingenious physician developed a syringe pump for
intensive care patients that, as well as providing normal
intravenous fluids, would set an alarm and deliver an
injection of potassium chloride once every 24 hours
unless it were deactivated. If nurses and doctors failed to
deactivate the potassium syringe and a patient died there
would be no physical intervention close to that point in
time that had hastened death. But it would rightly be
regarded as highly implausible to pretend that either the
invention of the pump, or the decision to use the pump
for a patient were not morally significant (and troubling)
actions. Furthermore, we should not exonerate the
bedside staff who failed to deactivate the syringe merely
because they omitted to act rather than took a positive
step to kill the patient.
As noted above, the overwhelming majority of guide-
lines for doctors about end-of-life decisions support the
equivalence thesis. Yet surveys of medical professionals
have repeatedly shown that medical staff remain uncon-
vinced. A survey of 148 Swedish intensive care staff in
1992 in Sweden revealed that only 37% believed that
there was no ethical difference between withholding and
withdrawing treatment.18 In the mid 1990s only 20% of
surveyed UK nurses19 and 30–40% of US medical and
nursing staff believed in the Equivalence Thesis.20 In a
very large international study of neonatal physicians
in 10 European countries published in 2000, 21–54% of
physicians believed that there was no difference between
withdrawing and withholding.21
WHY DO DOCTORS REJECT THE
EQUIVALENCE THESIS?
Why do medical staff continue to endorse Non-
Equivalence? One plausible psychological explanation is
that medical attitudes are a reflection of the status quo
bias, a serious and widespread cognitive bias in decision-
making.22 This bias, and the related omission bias23 may
16 M. Washofsky. 2005. A Jewish Guide to the Moral Maze of
Hi-tech Medicine. Available at: http://reformjudaismmag.org/Articles/
index.cfm?id=1048 (Accessed 25 Sept 2010); J. Kunin. 2010. Caring for
the Terminally Ill: Halachic Approaches to Withholding and With-
drawing of Therapy. Available at: http://www.medethics.org.il/articles/
JME/JMEM9/JMEM.9.2.asp [Accessed 05 Nov 2010]; V. Ravitsky.
Timers on Ventilators. BMJ 2005; 330: 415–417.
17 Ravitsky, op. cit. note. 16.
18 G. Melltorp & T. Nilstun. The Difference between Withholding and
Withdrawing Life-sustaining Treatment. Intensive Care Med 1997; 23:
1264–1267.
19 D.L. Dickenson. Are Medical Ethicists Out of Touch? Practitioner
Attitudes in the US and UK towards Decisions at the End of Life.
J Med Ethics 2000; 26: 254–260.
20 M.Z. Solomon et al. Decisions near the End of Life: Profes-
sional Views on Life-sustaining Treatments. Am J Pub Health 1993; 83:
14–23.
21 M. Rebagliato et al. Neonatal End-of-life Decision Making: Physi-
cians’ Attitudes and Relationship with Self-reported Practices in 10
European Countries. JAMA 2000; 284: 2451–2459. This proportion
does not appear to have increased over time. At a professional devel-
opment meeting in 2010 we performed a survey of 49 junior and senior
doctors working in intensive care in the Oxfordshire region of the UK.
39% of physicians agreed that withholding and withdrawal were ethi-
cally equivalent, 35% indicated that they were legally equivalent.
22 Status quo bias refers to an irrational or inappropriate preference
for the status quo. W. Samuelson & R. Zeckhauser. Status quo bias
in decision making. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 1988; 1: 7–59; N.
Bostrom & T. Ord. The Reversal Test: Eliminating Status Quo Bias in
Applied Ethics. Ethics 2006; 116: 656–679; D. Kahneman et al. Anoma-
lies: the Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion and Status Quo Bias. The
Journal of economic perspectives 1991; 5: 193–206.
23 The omission bias is a tendency to judge harm resulting from an
omission as being less morally serious than an equal harm resulting
from an action. J.H. Kordes-de Vaal. Intention and the Omission Bias:
Omissions Perceived as Nondecisions. Acta Psychol (Amst) 1996; 93:
161–172; J. Baron & I. Ritov. Omission Bias, Individual Differences
and Normality. Org Behav Hum Dec Proc 2004; 94: 74–85.
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lead doctors and nurses to intuitively believe that it is
worse to actively stop a treatment than to decide not to
start it. There is some evidence that status quo and omis-
sion biases impact on doctors’ decision-making.24 In one
example, 125 US chest physicians were randomly pro-
vided with one of a pair of clinical vignettes.25 Physicians
were twice as likely to continue a treatment that had
already been started (of dubious benefit or possible harm)
than they were to start the treatment themselves.26 There
are no data on physicians’ belief in the acts/omissions
distinction, although this belief is widespread across
cultures, class and gender.27 Nevertheless, an intrinsic
distinction between acts and omissions has been persua-
sively refuted,28 and is denied by both consequentialists
and deontologists.29 If these biases were the explanation,
or a partial explanation, it would motivate further edu-
cation of intensive care staff, and attempts to overcome
the effect of cognitive bias on decisions.
A second possible explanation and justification of
medical attitudes is that in practice there are often factual
differences between the cases of treatment withdrawal
and treatment withholding that physicians encounter.
For example, there may be differences in prognosis
between a patient who has not yet received a treatment,
and a patient who has. Mr W appeared to stabilize after
receiving a short period of intensive care, at which point
he may have a reasonable chance of recovering from his
acute chest infection. However, prior to his intubation
there was a significant possibility that he would have a
cardiac arrest if intensive care were provided, or develop
refractory respiratory failure and die despite intensive
measures. If this is the explanation for medical staff
attitudes, then it does not problematically conflict with
ET. Doctors could agree with a hypothetical version
of Equivalence, but deny that the ceteris paribus clause
applies in many cases that they encounter.
But there is a third possible explanation of a medical
perception of NE. Consider the following:
Dr A is an intensive care physician managing a critical care
unit in a country with limited ICU resources. The ICU has a
single vacant bed, and all patients in the unit are receiving
respiratory support. It is the middle of the winter flu season,
and all other regional intensive care units are full.
Dr A is called to the emergency department to review Mr
North. North is critically ill, and will die without intensive
care. With intensive care he has approximately a 50% chance
of survival. Dr A is prepared to intubate North and admit
him to intensive care, but before A can do so he is called to
a second patient in the emergency department. Mr South is
critically ill, and will die without intensive care. With inten-
sive care South has approximately a 90% chance of survival.
Dr A can admit only one patient to intensive care (there is no
possibility of additional beds). It is likely that whichever
patient is not admitted to ICU will die.
Dr A elects to withhold intensive care fromNorth in order
to admit South to the ICU. An attempt is made to manage
North without intensive care, but he dies in the emergency
department.
Dr B is an intensive care physician managing a critical care
unit in a country with limited ICU resources. The ICU has a
single vacant bed, and all other patients in the unit are receiv-
ing respiratory support. It is the middle of the winter flu
season, and all other regional intensive care units are full.
Dr B is called to the emergency department to review Mr
West. West is critically ill, and will die without intensive care.
With intensive care he has approximately a 50% chance of
survival. Dr B intubates West and admits him to intensive
care, but just asWest is wheeled out of the emergency depart-
ment Dr B is called to a second patient in the emergency
department. Mr East is critically ill, and will die without
intensive care. With intensive care East has approximately a
90% chance of survival. Dr B can admit only one patient to
intensive care (there is no possibility of additional beds). It is
likely that whichever patient is not admitted to ICU will die.
Dr B elects to withdraw intensive care from West in order
to admit East to the ICU. An attempt is made to manage
West without intensive care, but he dies in the emergency
department.30
These cases differ from those above in that they are
explicitly motivated by distributive justice and limited
resources. One reason why Dr A’s actions may appear
permissible but not Dr B’s, is that resource allocation
is sometimes thought to be a legitimate consideration in
treatment withholding but not (or only rarely) in treat-
ment withdrawal decisions. If this were justified, the
Equivalence Thesis would be false.
RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND
NON-EQUIVALENCE
Adult intensive care units are often in a position where
they have no capacity, or very limited capacity, to admit
24 N.A. Christakis & D.A. Asch. Biases in How Physicians Choose to
Withdraw Life Support. Lancet 1993; 342: 642–646.
25 S.K. Aberegg et al. Omission Bias and Decision Making in Pulmo-
nary and Critical Care Medicine. Chest 2005; 128: 1497–1505.
26 Ibid.
27 M.D. Hauser. 2008. Moral minds : how nature designed our universal
sense of right and wrong. London: Abacus; Baron & Ritov, op. cit. note
23.
28 J. Rachels. Active and Passive Euthanasia. N Engl J Med 1975; 292:
78–80.
29 R. Gillon. Acts and Omissions, Killing and Letting Die. Br Med J
(Clin Res Ed) 1986; 292: 126–127.
30 These cases are derived from ones discussed by Sulmasy and Sugar-
man. Sulmasy & Sugarman, op. cit. note 4. Those authors claimed that
doctors would accept the actions of Dr A, but not Dr B because of
West’s prima facie claim on treatment (having had it started). Here, we
analyse an alternative explanation, that resource allocation per se may
make a difference between withdrawing and withholding decisions.
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further patients.31 Rationing of intensive care admission
is common.32 In one study from Hong Kong, 38% of
patients who were referred to the intensive care unit were
refused admission.33 Of those patients, almost half were
assessed as likely to benefit from intensive care admis-
sion, but were judged as having an insufficient priority
to justify admitting them. Consideration of available
resources appears to often influence doctors’ decisions
about withholding potentially life-prolonging medical
treatment.
On the other hand, resource allocation appears to play
a much smaller role in decisions about treatment with-
drawal in intensive care. A study published in 1983
revealed that a major resource shortage (a drop in inten-
sive care beds due to a lack of nursing staff) led to a
reduction in admissions, but did not appear to affect
treatment withdrawal decisions.34 In a survey published
in 1994, only 3% of chest physicians reported that treat-
ment withdrawal decisions were influenced by bed avail-
ability.35 There may be variation between countries. One
fifth of surveyed Italian intensivists were willing to with-
draw treatment from a patient with a lower probability of
survival than other patients needing admission.36 In con-
trast, a very large study of end-of-life decisions in inten-
sive care patients in 17 European countries published in
2008 found that cost effectiveness and need for an ICU
bed were the stated primary reason for decisions in less
than 1% of all cases.37
In a small survey, we presented intensive care doctors
in Oxfordshire with a version of the cases of North/South
and West/East.38 83% of the intensive care doctors sur-
veyed agreed that in the North/South case the patient
with a greater chance of survival should be admitted in
preference. By contrast only 9% of doctors agreed that in
the West/East cases the patient with higher risk of mor-
tality should be discharged in order to create a bed for the
other patient; 91% of the surveyed doctors appeared to
believe that treatment should not be withdrawn for
resource allocation reasons.
Resource allocation may at least partly explain
doctors’ belief in Non-equivalence. But what reasons
could there be to justify taking account of resource allo-
cation in treatment withholding decisions but not in
treatment withdrawal decisions in intensive care?
1. Fairness
One reason why doctors might choose not to withdraw
treatment fromWest, though East has a higher chance of
survival, is because they are acting on the basis of the
‘first-come-first-served’ rule.39 The American Thoracic
Society has recommended this approach as a fair means
of allocating intensive care unit resources.40 The advan-
tage of first-come-first-served as a heuristic for resource
allocation is that it is simple to implement, unambiguous,
and avoids the need for difficult or controversial judge-
ments about the relative merits of treating different
patients. It is arguably a fair decision-procedure because
it treats patients equally. However, first-come-first-served
is not consistent with other types of fairness. For
example, using a Rawlsian approach,41 decision-makers
behind the veil of ignorance would potentially choose a
rationing policy that endorsed ET. Given that they could
be either West or East, it would be rational to choose a
policy that gave them the greatest chance of life.42
First-come-first-served is vulnerable to other criti-
cisms. It would give preference to patients who are
wealthy, powerful or well connected (and able to reach
health care sooner).43 It also yields highly counterintuitive
conclusions. If West had only a 1% chance of survival
with intensive care, and East a 99% chance of survival,
first-come-first-served would give priority to West.
31 Consensus Statement on the Triage of Critically Ill Patients. Society
of Critical Care Medicine Ethics Committee. JAMA 1994; 271: 1200–
1203.
32 M.J. Strauss et al. Rationing of Intensive Care Unit Services. An
Everyday Occurrence. Ibid. 1986; 255: 1143–1146; T. Sinuff et al.
Rationing Critical Care Beds: a Systematic Review. Crit Care Med
2004; 32: 1588–1597.
33 G.M. Joynt et al. Prospective Evaluation of Patients Refused Admis-
sion to an Intensive Care Unit: Triage, Futility and Outcome. Intensive
Care Med 2001; 27: 1459–1465.
34 D.E. Singer et al. Rationing Intensive Care – Physician Responses to
a Resource Shortage. N Engl J Med 1983; 309: 1155–1160.
35 K. Faber-Langendoen. The Clinical Management of Dying Patients
Receiving Mechanical Ventilation. A Survey of Physician Practice.
Chest 1994; 106: 880–888.
36 A. Giannini & D. Consonni. Physicians’ Perceptions and Attitudes
Regarding Inappropriate Admissions and Resource Allocation in the
Intensive Care Setting. Br J Anaesth 2006; 96: 57–62.
37 C.L. Sprung et al. Reasons, Considerations, Difficulties and Docu-
mentation of End-of-life Decisions in European Intensive Care Units:
the ETHICUS Study. Intensive CareMed 2008; 34: 271–277. NBHalf of
the decisions made by doctors in this study were decisions to withhold
further treatment (without withdrawing treatment). Consequently it
appeared that once admitted to intensive care, resource allocation was
not explicitly taken into account for either treatment withdrawal or
withholding decisions. It is possible, however, that resource consider-
ations were a secondary factor in a larger proportion of cases.
38 See note 21. In the cases presented in the survey, doctors were not
told of the outcome for North or West. In the second case, East had
been admitted one hour before West’s presentation to intensive care.
39 G. Persad et al. Principles for Allocation of Scarce Medical Inter-
ventions. Lancet 2009; 373: 423–431.
40 Fair Allocation of Intensive Care Unit Resources. American Tho-
racic Society. Am J Respir Crit Care Med 1997; 156: 1282–1301.
41 J. McMillan & T. Hope. Justice-based Obligations in Intensive Care.
Lancet 2010; 375: 1156–1157.
42 What is more first-come-first served appears unfair in the emphasis
that it places on the order of presentation to hospital. Why should
a patient who happens to have arrived earlier receive preferential
treatment?
43 Persad et al., op. cit. note 39.
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Although the rule avoids having to choose between
patients on the basis of prognosis, exactly the same dis-
tinctions are drawn for treatment withholding. Why
should not these considerations be applied to treatment
withdrawal?
2. Conflict of interest
A second possible concern about allowing resource
allocation to affect treatment withdrawal decisions is that
this would lead to a conflict of interest. Clinicians treat-
ing patients in intensive care would be forced to make
‘tragic choices’ between the best interests of their current
patients, and the welfare of other patients.44 Clinicians’
relationship with existing patients may make it psycho-
logically difficult for them to choose between patients,
and make their assessment of prognosis vulnerable to
bias.
In contrast, one reason why triage is relatively un-
controversial is that it separates rationing decisions
from treatment decisions. A triage officer on a battle-
field or in an emergency department is responsible for
prioritizing treatment; they (usually) do not know or
have a relationship with the patients they are assessing.
This leaves other clinicians able to concentrate on the
best interests of patients. It might be thought that Dr
A is acting as a sort of triage officer when he chooses
between North and South, but that Dr B is placed in an
invidious position of having to juggle conflicting respon-
sibilities at the bedside.
But intensive care doctors who make decisions about
withholding treatment are not mere triage officers. They
already have to balance what would be best for individual
patients with what would be best for the wider group of
critically ill patients.45 These are not easy decisions, yet it
is not clear that Dr B’s choice is harder or more prone to
bias than Dr A’s. Furthermore, if we wanted to we could
overcome the conflict of interest in withdrawal decisions
by creating an additional level of triage above treating
doctors in intensive care. When there is a need to decline
intensive care for a patient who could potentially benefit,
the head of the unit or an intensive care clinician not
currently on clinical service might act as an impartial
arbiter between the competing claims of patients within
and outside the ICU.46
3. Slippery slope
A separate concern about withdrawing treatment
because of resource constraints is that even if this were
justified, it would potentially lead to withdrawal of
treatment from patients for morally unjustified reasons.
For example, if doctors were allowed to stop life-
prolonging treatment because another patient would
have a greater chance of benefit, this might allow
doctors to discriminate, consciously or subconsciously,
on the basis of race, gender, age or disability. Alter-
natively, it might lead doctors to seek to actively end the
lives of patients with a lower chance of survival, or a
lower predicted quality of life than other existing or
potential patients.
Either of these outcomes would be highly troubling.
However, it is not clear why treatment withdrawal
would make these outcomes more likely than treatment
withholding. Doctors currently withhold intensive care
admission on the grounds of limited resources, and
it would be possible for such decisions to be made
unjustly. Yet we do not take such concerns to mean
that doctors should not ration intensive care admis-
sion. Rather, we attempt to ensure that intensive care
beds are rationed only on the basis of morally relevant
criteria.
There is also no evidence that allowing doctors to with-
hold treatment on the basis of limited intensive care beds
has led doctors to practice involuntary euthanasia for
patients with poor prognosis. There is no good reason
to think that if resources were included in treatment
withdrawal decisions that this would be any more likely
to occur.
4. Consent
One potentially significant factor that may explain why
doctors prefer to manage limited resources by withhold-
ing treatment rather than by withdrawing treatment, is
that in the former situation there is often no need to
consult with patients or families, nor to obtain consent
for the decision. For example, in our experience at least,
requests for intensive care admission come from other
doctors, perhaps those in the emergency department or
ward. The intensive care clinician may decline admission
over the phone, or he or she may review the patient in
person. However, the decision not to admit to intensive
care is usually communicated back to referring physi-
cians, and not discussed directly with family members (or
with the patient). There is no practical nor legal need to
seek consent, since what is contemplated is non-provision
of a treatment.
In contrast, where a decision is made to cease poten-
tially life-prolonging treatment that has already been
started, there is usually a discussion in advance with
44 D. Orentlicher. Rationing Health Care: It’s a Matter of the Health
Care System’s Structure. Annals of health law 2010; 19: 449–464.
45 W. Sage. Physicians as Advocates. Houston Law Review 1999; 35:
1529–1630.
46 This sort of mechanism might also resolve residual concerns about
intensive care doctors’ greater duty of care to existing patients in the
ICU. This higher-level triage officer would not have a duty of care to
specific patients.
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family members to let them know that this is taking
place. For children at least, there is almost always a
need to obtain parents’ or surrogates’ agreement with
the decision to stop treatment. Such decisions are diffi-
cult enough when the primary reason for withdrawing
treatment is that it is no longer in the best interests of
the patient. However, it is easy to understand why
doctors would be reluctant to explain to family
members that treatment is not being provided because it
cannot be afforded or because another patient needs it
instead. It is highly likely that some families would
refuse to consent to treatment withdrawal on such a
basis.47
On the other hand, the fact that doctors don’t have to
embark on difficult discussions about limited resources
when they withhold treatment is a poor justification for
distinguishing between treatment withdrawal and with-
holding. If a patient is not going to be provided with
treatment because there are not enough intensive care
beds, that is something that family members and the
patient deserve to have explained to them whether or not
that treatment has already been started. Intensive care
staff should be prepared to justify their resource alloca-
tion decisions explicitly to patients and families. Further-
more, if it is justified to decide not to provide treatment
on resource grounds, then it seems unfair and inappro-
priate to seek consent from patient or surrogate for that
decision. If families or patients are allowed to overrule a
decision to ration treatment by declining consent, there is
a real risk that a subgroup of the community will dispro-
portionately bear the burden of rationing decisions. This
may selectively disadvantage those patients whose surro-
gates are not well spoken, literate, or aware of their
rights. Perhaps families and patients should simply be
informed that treatment is not available because of
limited resources.
5. Legal vulnerability
Finally, there is the possibility that withdrawing treat-
ment for reasons of limited resources would make
doctors vulnerable to legal sanction in a way that treat-
ment withholding decisions would not.48 A full dis-
cussion of the legal status of treatment withdrawal and
withholding decisions is beyond the scope of this paper.
However, it is worth noting a couple of points about
UK law (with which we are most familiar). Firstly, as
mentioned above, there is explicit judicial support for
the equivalence thesis. There is also explicit acknowl-
edgement in a number of cases that health care resources
are limited and that it is reasonable for doctors and
healthcare authorities to make decisions about the dis-
tribution of such resources.49
. . . health authorities may on occasion find that they
have too few resources, either human or material or
both, to treat all the patients whom they would like to
treat in the way in which they would like to treat them.
It is then their duty to make choices.50
The combination of these two facts may imply that the
courts would support withdrawal of treatment on the
grounds of limited resources. However, we are not aware
of any case law precedent in the UK for withdrawing
life-sustaining treatment other than on the basis of the
best interests of the patient, and it is conceivable that a
court might not be so accepting of treatment withdrawal
decisions for reasons of limited resources.51 Secondly, if a
doctor were to withdraw treatment on the basis of limited
resources, and were subsequently brought before the
court, they might try to defend themselves against a
charge of negligence by drawing on the Bolam principle.52
This principle asserts that a doctor is not negligent if he or
she acts in accordance with practice that is accepted by a
reasonable body of medical opinion. However, the evi-
dence cited above suggests that the vast majority of inten-
sive care doctors would not withdraw treatment on the
grounds of resources, potentially making the doctor in
question negligent at law.53
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, even if it is the
case that doctors would be more legally vulnerable for
withdrawing treatment on the grounds of resources than
for withholding it, there is a further question about what
the law should be. We have outlined four potential argu-
ments in favour of restricting resource allocation to treat-
ment withholding decisions, but none of these provide a
conclusive justification of Non-equivalence.
47 There is a separate concern about counselling and consent. Although
currently treatment withdrawal decisions are rarely, if ever, primarily
motivated by a shortage of intensive care beds, patients’ families often
cite this concern as one reason for refusing to believe the prognosis
offered by doctors, or for refusing to agree to treatment withdrawal.
Currently it is possible for doctors to claim sincerely that their treatment
withdrawal decisions are only ever motivated by the interests of the
patient. However, if resource allocation were allowed to play a signifi-
cant role in withdrawal decisions in intensive care, this would no longer
be the case. Families might be more likely to insist on treatment con-
tinuing, even in those cases where doctors are genuinely motivated
solely by the patient’s interests.
48 N. Eastman et al. Triaging for Adult Critical Care in the Event of
Overwhelming Need. Intensive Care Med 2010; 36: 1076–1082.
49 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789; Re J (A Minor) (Child
in Care: Medical Treatment) [1993] Fam 15; R. v Cambridge Health
Authority [1995] EWCA Civ 49.
50 Re J (A Minor) (Child in Care: Medical Treatment), op. cit. note 49.
51 Eastman et al., op. cit. note 48.
52 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management committee [1957] 1 WLR 583.
53 Indeed, this paper might be cited in support of a claim that the
standard of care is not to include resource considerations in treatment
withdrawal decisions. However, our aim (below) will be to argue that
the standard of care should change.
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THE COSTS OF NON-EQUIVALENCE
There are relatively weak reasons for medical pro-
fessionals to apply resource constraints to treatment
withholding, but not treatment withdrawal decisions.
But why does it matter if doctors use this to support
Non-equivalence in practice?
The problem is that non-equivalence comes at a signifi-
cant cost. Where intensive care treatment is continued for
patients whose prognosis is poor, it is likely to mean that
other patients (with a greater chance of benefiting from
intensive care) are turned away.
This is not just a theoretical concern. Studies that have
looked at patients who were referred to intensive care
units have found increased risks of death in patients who
are refused admission.54 After adjusting for markers of
severity of illness, patients who were refused admission
had a 2.5 fold increased risk of death.55 One study, of
patients who were referred to six intensive care units
in the UK, found that a quarter of patients who were
referred were declined admission, including 116 judged
(on the basis of severity of illness at presentation) to have
been referred appropriately.56 On the basis of the excess
mortality in this group of patients it was estimated at the
time (mid 1990s) that lack of access to intensive care beds
was potentially responsible for 2100–2500 preventable
deaths per year in England – a figure equal to the number
of deaths on the roads.57
What is more, these studies may underestimate the
total number of deaths attributable to lack of inten-
sive care beds, since patients (who might benefit from
intensive care but are likely to be a lower priority) may
not be referred to intensive care.58 In a study in 5 hos-
pitals over a 16 day period in Israel, (where intensive
care beds are in short supply), only 13% of patients
who acutely deteriorated and who met admission
criteria for intensive care were admitted to intensive
care. The majority were managed in monitored beds
elsewhere in the hospital.59 Patients who deteriorated




There is no good ethical reason to confine resource allo-
cation to treatment withholding decisions. Furthermore,
non-equivalence leads to the preventable death of criti-
cally ill patients who are declined intensive care. Perhaps
intensive care doctors should reconsider their approach
to rationing and treatment decisions? If they were pre-
pared to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from patients
with a worse prognosis than other patients in need of
admission, what would this mean for practice?61
Here are two potential proposals for implementing
equivalence in intensive care.
1. Reduce the mortality threshold for
treatment withdrawal
In the UK the mortality in patients who had intensive
care withheld because of poor prognosis was approxi-
mately 80% in one study.62 In contrast, in a large survey
of UK intensive care units, 99% of patients who had
active treatment withdrawn died.63 The ET suggests
that these mortality rates should be closer. One potential
compromise would be to consider either withdrawal or
withholding of life-sustaining treatment on the basis of
limited resources if the predicted mortality with intensive
care were greater than 90%. This would also fit with
54 Sinuff et al., op. cit. note 32; C.L. Sprung et al., Evaluation of
Triage Decisions for Intensive Care Admission.Crit CareMed 1999; 27:
1073–1079; Ridley & Morris, op. cit. note 2.
55 Sprung et al., op. cit. note 54.
56 Metcalfe et al., op. cit. note 2.
57 Ibid.
58 E. Simchen et al., Survival of Critically Ill Patients Hospitalized in
and out of Intensive Care Units under Paucity of Intensive Care Unit
Beds. Crit Care Med 2004; 32: 1654–1661.
59 E. Simchen et al. Survival of Critically Ill Patients Hospitalized In
and Out of Intensive Care. Crit Care Med 2007; 35: 449–457.
60 Ibid.
61 Embracing ET in intensive care does not mean that treatment should
be withdrawn whenever there is a patient with a slightly better prognosis
in need of a bed. There is often considerable uncertainty about prog-
nosis for critically ill patients; it is rarely possible to quantify survival
chances in the way that we have outlined in the cases above, and it may
be extremely difficult to compare prognosis between patients with very
different illnesses. Furthermore, it may compromise the care of critically
ill patients in intensive care if their physicians were constantly attempt-
ing to establish their prognosis and to compare them with other patients
every time that they were faced with a new admission.
62 Metcalfe et al., op. cit. note 2.
63 Wunsch et al., op. cit. note 2. In a number of studies the mortality
risk for patients who are appropriately declined intensive care admis-
sion is approximately 50%. Sinuff et al., op. cit. note 32; Sprung et al.,
op. cit. note 54; Ridley & Morris, op. cit. note 2. However, this includes
both patients who are judged too well to benefit from ICU admission (ie
too low a mortality risk), and those who are judged too sick to benefit.
The risk of death in the latter group is 65–90% in published studies in
Israel, the UK and Hong Kong. Sprung et al., op. cit. note 54; Metcalfe
et al., op. cit. note 2; Joynt et al., op. cit. note 33. In comparison, the
mortality rate (prior to hospital discharge) in patients who have inten-
sive care withdrawn is 93–99%. T. Nolin & R. Andersson. Withdrawal
of Medical Treatment in the ICU. A Cohort Study of 318 cases during
1994–2000. Acta Anaesthiol Scand 2003; 47: 501–507; J.P. Lewis et al.,
Outcome of Patients who have Therapy Withheld or Withdrawn in
ICU. Anaesth Intensive Care 2007; 35: 387–392; A. Esteban et al., With-
drawing and Withholding Life Support in the Intensive Care Unit: a
Spanish Prospective Multi-centre Observational Study. Intensive Care
Med 2001; 27: 1744–1749.
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cost-effectiveness analysis of adult intensive care, since
provision of adult intensive care in the UK has been
estimated to cost more than £20,000 per quality-adjusted
life year saved once the absolute risk-reduction of death is
less than 10%.64
The level of this threshold will differ between countries
depending on the availability of intensive care beds.
2. Time-limited trials of intensive care
A second option would be to offer patients with a high
risk of death despite intensive care a trial of treatment
for a defined period of time. For example, such patients
(and their families) could be offered a 48 or 72-hour
period of intensive care with an expectation that at the
end of that time treatment would be withdrawn unless
the patient had shown a definite response to treatment.
This policy would enable more prognostic information
to be collected prior to treatment limitation. It would
allow more rational and considered treatment decisions
to be made.
We do not have space here to explore in detail how
these proposals might work: that will be the subject of
another paper. But it is worth briefly noting their poten-
tial impact. While doctors’ belief in non-equivalence is
not the sole cause of a lack of intensive care beds, it is
likely that the proposals would improve access to inten-
sive care. They would enable some patients to access
intensive care who would otherwise be denied admission.
In a very large study of UK intensive care units, one
quarter of patients who had all active treatment with-
drawn were in intensive care for more than six days
before this decision, and some patients had stays that
were considerably longer than this (103 days in one
case).65 If a greater acceptance of the equivalence thesis
reduced by only one day on average the period of time
before deciding to withdraw treatment in this group of
patients, it could save the lives of up to 100 patients in
England and Wales per year.66
CONCLUSION
Despite the powerful and straightforward arguments in
favour of the equivalence of withholding and withdraw-
ing treatment, and despite numerous supportive profes-
sional guidelines and legal decisions over several decades,
the majority of doctors appear unconvinced. In this paper
we have investigated an issue that has been neglected in
the debate, and have sought to move past the ethical
impasse that has developed.
Medical endorsement of non-equivalence is manifest
in resource allocation decisions. Intensive care physi-
cians are forced to consider limited resources in their
decisions about life-sustaining treatment, yet they appear
to apply this largely in their decisions about treatment
withholding and little, if at all, in treatment withdrawal
decisions. We explored five possible reasons for restrict-
ing rationing of intensive care to treatment withhold-
ing. The need to obtain consent, and the possibility
of legal vulnerability may explain why doctors prefer
to ration by withholding intensive care rather than by
withdrawing the same treatment, though the most likely
underlying reason for doctors’ belief in Non-equivalence
is status quo bias, combined with intuitive support for
the acts/omissions distinction. This provides an expla-
nation but not a justification for a practical distinction
between withdrawing and withholding. On the contrary,
rather than justifying non-equivalence, resource alloca-
tion provides a separate strong argument in favour of
equivalence.
There are two alternatives. If we continue to allow
doctors to withhold treatment that they would not with-
draw, some patients will die whose lives could have been
significantly prolonged. Alternatively, if we are serious
about the equivalence of withdrawing and withholding
treatment, then we need to develop a legal and procedural
64 Ridley & Morris, op. cit. note 2. In the UK the National Institute for
Clinical Excellence approves treatments with an incremental cost-
effectiveness of less than £20–30,000 per quality-adjusted-life-year
saved.
65 Wunsch et al., op. cit. note 2. Long-stay patients in intensive care
constitute only a small proportion of admissions, but have a high mor-
tality rate, and are responsible for up to 50% of ICU costs. D.T. Wong
et al. Utilization of Intensive Care Unit Days in a Canadian Medical-
Surgical Intensive Care Unit. Crit Care Med 1999; 27: 1319–1324; C.A.
Bashour et al. Long-term Survival and Functional Capacity in Cardiac
Surgery Patients after Prolonged Intensive Care. Crit Care Med 2000;
28: 3847–3853; M. Hughes et al. Outcome of Long-stay Intensive Care
Patients. Intensive Care Med 2001; 27: 779–782. The other significance
of long-stay patients in intensive care is that they have a disproportion-
ate impact on bed availability. Queuing models of intensive care admis-
sion highlight an exquisite sensitivity of the system to bed crises when
there are staff shortages or long-staying patients. M.L. McManus et al.
Queuing Theory Accurately Models the Need for Critical Care
Resources. Anesthesiology 2004; 100: 1271–1276.
66 In the UK 99/1000 admissions to intensive care have all active treat-
ment withdrawn. Wunsch et al., op. cit. note 2. There are 80798 admis-
sions to intensive care units in England and Wales per year. Ridley &
Morris, op. cit. note 2. If a quarter of those who have all treatment
withdrawn had their ICU length of stay reduced by 1 day, it would yield
99/1000*80798*0.25 = 2000 ICU bed days per year. Given an average
length of stay of 5 days, this would mean that 400 patients could be
admitted to intensive care who would otherwise be refused. On the basis
of a 25% absolute risk reduction in the risk of death in appropriately
referred patients admitted to intensive care, (Sinuff et al., op. cit. note
32; Sprung et al., op. cit. note 54; Metcalfe et al., op. cit. note 2.) 100
lives could potentially be saved.
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basis for withdrawing intensive care treatment on the
basis of limited resources. We have briefly outlined two
potential ways to move practice towards equivalence.
The thresholds for withholding and for withdrawal could
be brought closer, for example aiming to withdraw or
withhold treatment for patients who have a greater than
90% chance of dying despite treatment. Alternatively, or
additionally, it would be worth considering time-limited
trials of intensive care treatment as a means of fairly
managing this scarce resource. It is not enough for ethi-
cists to repeat ad nauseam that withholding and with-
drawing treatment are equivalent. We must find ways of
translating ethical analysis into practice.
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